ADMA Biologics [ADMA] — Trade Construction & Risk
As of 2026-07-29 · spot $8.79 (2026-07-28 close) · framework v1.7.0
This memo issues no position verdict. It scores Criteria and sizes what a position would look like if the book chose to take one. The book decides.
1. What the analysis produced
| 12-month target | $10.45 (+18.9% to spot); range $7.91–$12.70 |
| Implied-path result | Required 5-year revenue CAGR 13.3% vs company-guided 6.8% ⇒ margin −6.5pp |
| Quality Criteria | FAIL — accruals 17.3%, CFO/NI 0.34x; stated non-reinvestment in the binding input |
| Valuation Criteria | FAIL |
| Liquidity Criteria | Equity PASS; options FAIL |
| Momentum (MEASURED) | 12-1 −54.5%; −64.5% from the April 2025 high; 252d vol 55.4% |
The two mandatory outputs disagree in sign, and that is not a contradiction — it is the point of running
both. Over 12 months the name can re-rate toward a plasma-peer EBIT multiple on a guidance-met print
(+18.9%). Over five years today's price still requires growth the company is not guiding to. valuation.md:
they measure different things over different horizons. The ownership test is the implied path, and it fails.
2. If the book took a position — construction
2.1 Vehicle: common equity only. Options are not investable.
The chain was pulled, as the Liquidity Criteria requires. Full surface, Alpaca, 2026-07-29:
| Expiry | Contracts | Total open interest |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-21 | 56 | 15,623 |
| 2026-09-18 | 34 | 119 |
| 2026-11-20 | 50 | 31,565 |
| 2027-01-15 | 44 | 16,591 |
| 2027-02-19 | 34 | 21 |
Representative quotes, 2027-01-15 (the natural 6-month expiry):
| Contract | Strike | OI | Bid | Ask | Spread to mid | Delta |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ADMA270115C00010000 | $10.0 | 958 | 0.58 | 1.73 | ±50% | 0.48 |
| ADMA270115C00013000 | $13.0 | 2,232 | 0.23 | 0.58 | ±43% | 0.23 |
| ADMA270115C00008000 | $8.0 | 181 | 0.72 | 3.42 | ±65% | 0.67 |
| ADMA270115P00010000 | $10.0 | 94 | 0.92 | 3.86 | ±62% | −0.51 |
| ADMA270115C00015000 | $15.0 | 1,374 | 0.00 | 0.77 | no bid | — |
Verdict: no defined-risk structure is fillable at a sensible price. The deepest single strike on the entire
five-expiry surface carries 2,232 contracts, open interest is scattered across odd strikes, and every
two-legged structure would cross 85–130% of combined spread. This is the HCA lesson in criteria.md: "a
vehicle that cannot be filled is not a vehicle." Options: FAIL.
2.2 Equity liquidity: ample
| 63-day median dollar volume | $27.5m |
| 20-day median dollar volume | $21.7m |
| 63-day median share volume | 3.28m |
At 10% of ADV a $2m position exits in one session. Equity: PASS. Size is constrained by conviction and volatility, not by liquidity.
2.3 Sizing, if taken
Inverse-volatility sizing is the framework's active protection (criteria.md, Downside Criteria interim
control). At 55.4% realised 252-day vol, ADMA sits in the top volatility tier and sizes down automatically.
Correlation to SPY is 0.20 (β 0.88) — the risk here is almost entirely idiosyncratic and single-name. It will not be diversified away by anything else in a book; it will be diversified into.
Any position would be a top-tier-vol, BINDING-fail name. On a long-only absolute-return book that fails
Quality and Valuation, the size is zero. No entry, exit, or stop is proposed, because proposing one for a
name that fails two BINDING Criteria would be the type-discipline failure criteria.md warns about.
3. Downside Criteria (MEASURED — logged, scored, blocks nothing)
Volatility is not the risk. Permanent impairment is.
3.1 The permanent-loss case, with its named cause
Named cause: erosion of ASCENIV's price premium, by exactly the mechanism that destroyed BIVIGAM's economics inside the last twelve months.
This is not hypothetical extrapolation. It is the observed behaviour of the same company's other IVIG in the same industry reset:
- BIVIGAM revenue fell −54.0% year over year in Q1 2026, which ADMA attributes to "lower volume as a result of competitive pressures in the standard immune globulin industry."
- The company describes the cause as "elevated raw material plasma supply, increased competitive PDT inventories across the distribution network and aggressive discounting and rebating in standard IG."
- ADMA's defence is that ASCENIV is insulated because it is a late-line therapy with patented high-titer pooling. That defence held in Q1 2026 (+27.7%). It is a product-differentiation argument, and product differentiation in plasma-derived IG has a poor record of surviving sustained oversupply.
- ADMA has 73% of revenue with two distributors. In an oversupplied market, two buyers controlling three-quarters of your volume have the pricing power, not you.
If ASCENIV's premium compresses toward the standard-IG level, ADMA's 40.6% EBIT margin converges on the listed plasma peer set — EBS 13.5%, Kamada 14.4%, Grifols 16.5%.
3.2 Scenarios
| Scenario | Revenue | EBIT margin | Multiple | Price | vs spot | P |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — ASCENIV reasserts ~20%, guidance beaten, re-rate to KMDA | $600m | 44.0% | 12.7x | $13.73 | +56% | 0.15 |
| Base — FY2026 guidance met, plasma-peer-mid multiple | $567m | 43.1% | 10.5x | $10.44 | +19% | 0.35 |
| Bear-1 — IG reset persists, margin gives back to 30% | $480m | 30.0% | 9.0x | $5.16 | −41% | 0.30 |
| Bear-2 — permanent-loss case: ASCENIV premium erodes to peer level | $500m | 15.0% | 10.0x | $2.88 | −67% | 0.15 |
| Bear-3 — peer margin and peer-low multiple | $480m | 14.5% | 8.0x | $2.08 | −76% | 0.05 |
Probabilities are estimates and are logged to be Brier-scored (ledger_scorer.py). They are not evidence
and nothing in this memo is gated on them. Per criteria.md, the sensitivity that matters was run on the exit
multiple, not on these probabilities.
Probability-weighted: $7.61 (−13.4%). Recorded for scoring, not used as a decision input — criteria.md
retired the expected-return hurdle and warns explicitly against maximising over a known-biased estimate.
3.3 Is there a going-concern case? No — and it must be argued explicitly, so here it is.
| Cash (2026-03-31) | $138.2m |
| Total debt | $196.9m |
| Net debt | $58.7m |
| FY2026 guided Adj EBITDA | $265–300m |
| Total leverage at guidance mid | 0.70x (covenant max 2.50x) |
| Leverage if Adj EBITDA fell to $150m | 1.31x |
| Leverage if Adj EBITDA fell to $100m | 1.97x |
| Covenant compliance at 2026-03-31 | In compliance (10-Q) |
| Facility maturity | 5 August 2028 |
| Q1 2026 cash from operations | $58m |
Adjusted EBITDA would have to fall ~72% from guidance before the 2.50x leverage covenant binds. The permanent-loss case here is a valuation impairment, not a solvency one. Flagged as required and dismissed on the numbers.
3.4 The capital-allocation risk that is live
The $500m repurchase authorisation is open-ended and the ASR has ~5.0m shares still to be delivered by August 2026. The March 2026 tranche was funded with $125m of revolver debt at $16.58/share, five days after guidance that was cut 12–17% ten weeks later — a mark-to-market loss of roughly 47%. The risk is not that the buyback is imprudent in isolation; it is that the same forecasting process that mis-sized it is still the one producing FY2026 guidance. Any further debt-funded repurchase before the FY2026 guidance is re-established by two clean prints should be treated as a negative signal, not a positive one.
4. What would change this analysis
The analysis is falsifiable and the falsifying events are dated.
| Test | Threshold | What it would prove |
|---|---|---|
| Q2 2026 revenue (expected early Aug 2026, date not announced) | ≥ $135m | Q1 really was a trough and the destock is done. Management said the April run-rate was "in line with Q1 direct sales" — that implies ~$115m, not $135m. A print at or above $135m breaks the deceleration read. |
| Q2 2026 revenue | ≤ $118m | Two consecutive flat/down quarters. "Temporary dislocation" fails on its own terms. |
| DSO at Q2 2026 | < 75 days | The receivable build was genuinely April timing, as management stated. Would materially repair the accruals finding. |
| DSO at Q2 2026 | > 100 days | Structural, not timing. Accruals finding stands and strengthens. |
| FY2026 guidance | Reaffirmed at $530–560m | Forecasting credibility begins to rebuild. |
| FY2026 guidance | Cut again | Second cut in two quarters after a five-year target was withdrawn. |
| Long-term guidance | Reinstated with a mechanism | Would require a named source of incremental high-titer plasma. Watch for it. |
| Gross margin | Sustains ≥ 68% for two more quarters | The yield step is durable and the mix shift is not just BIVIGAM's collapse flattering the ratio. |
| BIVIGAM | Stabilises above ~$15m/qtr | The revenue drag stops compounding. |
5. Ledger entry
Logged to trade_recommendations.jsonl as ANALYSIS_ONLY — no position recommended, carrying the bear case,
its named cause and its probability for Brier scoring, per the Downside Criteria promotion path in
criteria.md.
ticker ADMA
date 2026-07-29
action NONE (analysis only; memo issues no verdict)
spot 8.79
target_12m 10.45 (+18.9%)
implied_path required 13.3% CAGR vs 6.8% guided -> margin -6.5pp
binding_fails Quality (accruals + non-reinvestment), Valuation
bear_case ASCENIV price premium erodes to plasma-peer level; $2.88 (-67%)
bear_cause premium erosion in an oversupplied IG market, as already
observed in BIVIGAM (-54% YoY) within the same 12 months
bear_probability 0.15
vehicle equity only; options chain pulled and FAILS liquidity