ADMA Biologics, Inc. [ADMA] · Equity Underwriting Memo

Trade Construction

ADMA Biologics [ADMA] — Trade Construction & Risk

As of 2026-07-29 · spot $8.79 (2026-07-28 close) · framework v1.7.0

This memo issues no position verdict. It scores Criteria and sizes what a position would look like if the book chose to take one. The book decides.


1. What the analysis produced

12-month target $10.45 (+18.9% to spot); range $7.91–$12.70
Implied-path result Required 5-year revenue CAGR 13.3% vs company-guided 6.8%margin −6.5pp
Quality Criteria FAIL — accruals 17.3%, CFO/NI 0.34x; stated non-reinvestment in the binding input
Valuation Criteria FAIL
Liquidity Criteria Equity PASS; options FAIL
Momentum (MEASURED) 12-1 −54.5%; −64.5% from the April 2025 high; 252d vol 55.4%

The two mandatory outputs disagree in sign, and that is not a contradiction — it is the point of running both. Over 12 months the name can re-rate toward a plasma-peer EBIT multiple on a guidance-met print (+18.9%). Over five years today's price still requires growth the company is not guiding to. valuation.md: they measure different things over different horizons. The ownership test is the implied path, and it fails.


2. If the book took a position — construction

2.1 Vehicle: common equity only. Options are not investable.

The chain was pulled, as the Liquidity Criteria requires. Full surface, Alpaca, 2026-07-29:

Expiry Contracts Total open interest
2026-08-21 56 15,623
2026-09-18 34 119
2026-11-20 50 31,565
2027-01-15 44 16,591
2027-02-19 34 21

Representative quotes, 2027-01-15 (the natural 6-month expiry):

Contract Strike OI Bid Ask Spread to mid Delta
ADMA270115C00010000 $10.0 958 0.58 1.73 ±50% 0.48
ADMA270115C00013000 $13.0 2,232 0.23 0.58 ±43% 0.23
ADMA270115C00008000 $8.0 181 0.72 3.42 ±65% 0.67
ADMA270115P00010000 $10.0 94 0.92 3.86 ±62% −0.51
ADMA270115C00015000 $15.0 1,374 0.00 0.77 no bid

Verdict: no defined-risk structure is fillable at a sensible price. The deepest single strike on the entire five-expiry surface carries 2,232 contracts, open interest is scattered across odd strikes, and every two-legged structure would cross 85–130% of combined spread. This is the HCA lesson in criteria.md: "a vehicle that cannot be filled is not a vehicle." Options: FAIL.

2.2 Equity liquidity: ample

63-day median dollar volume $27.5m
20-day median dollar volume $21.7m
63-day median share volume 3.28m

At 10% of ADV a $2m position exits in one session. Equity: PASS. Size is constrained by conviction and volatility, not by liquidity.

2.3 Sizing, if taken

Inverse-volatility sizing is the framework's active protection (criteria.md, Downside Criteria interim control). At 55.4% realised 252-day vol, ADMA sits in the top volatility tier and sizes down automatically.

Correlation to SPY is 0.20 (β 0.88) — the risk here is almost entirely idiosyncratic and single-name. It will not be diversified away by anything else in a book; it will be diversified into.

Any position would be a top-tier-vol, BINDING-fail name. On a long-only absolute-return book that fails Quality and Valuation, the size is zero. No entry, exit, or stop is proposed, because proposing one for a name that fails two BINDING Criteria would be the type-discipline failure criteria.md warns about.


3. Downside Criteria (MEASURED — logged, scored, blocks nothing)

Volatility is not the risk. Permanent impairment is.

3.1 The permanent-loss case, with its named cause

Named cause: erosion of ASCENIV's price premium, by exactly the mechanism that destroyed BIVIGAM's economics inside the last twelve months.

This is not hypothetical extrapolation. It is the observed behaviour of the same company's other IVIG in the same industry reset:

If ASCENIV's premium compresses toward the standard-IG level, ADMA's 40.6% EBIT margin converges on the listed plasma peer set — EBS 13.5%, Kamada 14.4%, Grifols 16.5%.

3.2 Scenarios

Scenario Revenue EBIT margin Multiple Price vs spot P
Bull — ASCENIV reasserts ~20%, guidance beaten, re-rate to KMDA $600m 44.0% 12.7x $13.73 +56% 0.15
Base — FY2026 guidance met, plasma-peer-mid multiple $567m 43.1% 10.5x $10.44 +19% 0.35
Bear-1 — IG reset persists, margin gives back to 30% $480m 30.0% 9.0x $5.16 −41% 0.30
Bear-2permanent-loss case: ASCENIV premium erodes to peer level $500m 15.0% 10.0x $2.88 −67% 0.15
Bear-3 — peer margin and peer-low multiple $480m 14.5% 8.0x $2.08 −76% 0.05

Probabilities are estimates and are logged to be Brier-scored (ledger_scorer.py). They are not evidence and nothing in this memo is gated on them. Per criteria.md, the sensitivity that matters was run on the exit multiple, not on these probabilities.

Probability-weighted: $7.61 (−13.4%). Recorded for scoring, not used as a decision inputcriteria.md retired the expected-return hurdle and warns explicitly against maximising over a known-biased estimate.

3.3 Is there a going-concern case? No — and it must be argued explicitly, so here it is.

Cash (2026-03-31) $138.2m
Total debt $196.9m
Net debt $58.7m
FY2026 guided Adj EBITDA $265–300m
Total leverage at guidance mid 0.70x (covenant max 2.50x)
Leverage if Adj EBITDA fell to $150m 1.31x
Leverage if Adj EBITDA fell to $100m 1.97x
Covenant compliance at 2026-03-31 In compliance (10-Q)
Facility maturity 5 August 2028
Q1 2026 cash from operations $58m

Adjusted EBITDA would have to fall ~72% from guidance before the 2.50x leverage covenant binds. The permanent-loss case here is a valuation impairment, not a solvency one. Flagged as required and dismissed on the numbers.

3.4 The capital-allocation risk that is live

The $500m repurchase authorisation is open-ended and the ASR has ~5.0m shares still to be delivered by August 2026. The March 2026 tranche was funded with $125m of revolver debt at $16.58/share, five days after guidance that was cut 12–17% ten weeks later — a mark-to-market loss of roughly 47%. The risk is not that the buyback is imprudent in isolation; it is that the same forecasting process that mis-sized it is still the one producing FY2026 guidance. Any further debt-funded repurchase before the FY2026 guidance is re-established by two clean prints should be treated as a negative signal, not a positive one.


4. What would change this analysis

The analysis is falsifiable and the falsifying events are dated.

Test Threshold What it would prove
Q2 2026 revenue (expected early Aug 2026, date not announced) ≥ $135m Q1 really was a trough and the destock is done. Management said the April run-rate was "in line with Q1 direct sales" — that implies ~$115m, not $135m. A print at or above $135m breaks the deceleration read.
Q2 2026 revenue ≤ $118m Two consecutive flat/down quarters. "Temporary dislocation" fails on its own terms.
DSO at Q2 2026 < 75 days The receivable build was genuinely April timing, as management stated. Would materially repair the accruals finding.
DSO at Q2 2026 > 100 days Structural, not timing. Accruals finding stands and strengthens.
FY2026 guidance Reaffirmed at $530–560m Forecasting credibility begins to rebuild.
FY2026 guidance Cut again Second cut in two quarters after a five-year target was withdrawn.
Long-term guidance Reinstated with a mechanism Would require a named source of incremental high-titer plasma. Watch for it.
Gross margin Sustains ≥ 68% for two more quarters The yield step is durable and the mix shift is not just BIVIGAM's collapse flattering the ratio.
BIVIGAM Stabilises above ~$15m/qtr The revenue drag stops compounding.

5. Ledger entry

Logged to trade_recommendations.jsonl as ANALYSIS_ONLY — no position recommended, carrying the bear case, its named cause and its probability for Brier scoring, per the Downside Criteria promotion path in criteria.md.

ticker            ADMA
date              2026-07-29
action            NONE (analysis only; memo issues no verdict)
spot              8.79
target_12m        10.45   (+18.9%)
implied_path      required 13.3% CAGR vs 6.8% guided -> margin -6.5pp
binding_fails     Quality (accruals + non-reinvestment), Valuation
bear_case         ASCENIV price premium erodes to plasma-peer level; $2.88 (-67%)
bear_cause        premium erosion in an oversupplied IG market, as already
                  observed in BIVIGAM (-54% YoY) within the same 12 months
bear_probability  0.15
vehicle           equity only; options chain pulled and FAILS liquidity