ADMA Biologics [ADMA] — Valuation

As of 2026-07-29 · spot $8.79 (2026-07-28 close) · framework v1.7.0 · valuation.md two-output rule

Two outputs are mandatory and neither replaces the other: a 12-month target and the implied-path test. Both are produced below.

1. Verified inputs

2. Anchoring the exit multiple — this is where the screen breaks

valuation.md: "An exit multiple may only be drawn from a comparator set whose growth brackets the subject's growth at the exit year. If no such comparator exists, the multiple is UNIDENTIFIED."

2.1 The screen's anchor

The screen used 23.3x EBIT, basis GROWTH_MATCHED, exit_multiple_peer_n: 143. It was matched to the screen's demonstrated growth of 49.0% — across a 143-name universe-wide set spanning every industry.

Two problems, both fatal:

1. ADMA does not grow at 49%. That is a FY2022→FY2025 lookback. FY2025 grew +19.6%; Q1 2026 grew −0.3%; the company guides FY2026 to +3.9% to +9.8% and has withdrawn all long-term guidance.
2. A 143-name cross-industry set is not an end-market comparator. ADMA is a plasma fractionator whose output is bounded by litres of qualifying plasma and a 7–12-month batch cycle. The multiple a 49%-growth software or AI-infrastructure name commands is not evidence about what a plasma fractionator commands.

23.3x also implies something no one would assert out loud. ADMA trades at 10.5x TTM clean EBIT today. An exit multiple of 23.3x in year 5 requires +12.8x of multiple EXPANSION (+122%) for a business whose revenue growth has gone to zero. The screen's entire +44.7pp margin is produced by that unstated assumption.

2.2 The growth-matched plasma set, built here

Pulled from SEC XBRL companyfacts and Alpaca prices, 2026-07-29:

Method notes, stated so the numbers can be checked: - EBS: 51,596,296 shares × $7.245 = $373.8m equity; + $589.7m LongTermDebt − $160.3m cash = $803.2m EV; ÷ FY2025 EBIT $100m. - KMDA: 57,686,056 × $7.05 = $406.7m; − $75.5m cash = $331.2m EV (last tagged borrowings are $3.8m at 2021-12-31; Kamada is treated as effectively debt-free and this is flagged as unverified); ÷ FY2025 EBIT $26m. - GRFS excluded on principle, not omitted by accident. Grifols files IFRS with no reliably tagged share count or current borrowings in its SEC XBRL, and its EV is dominated by several billion euro of net debt I could not source from a primary filing. Its growth is used for the bracket test only. No Grifols multiple is asserted anywhere in this memo.

2.3 Is the multiple IDENTIFIED?

The comparator growth range is −28.8% to +11.8% (with Grifols' +9.4% inside it).

• Against ADMA's guided FY2026 growth of +3.9% to +9.8% — bracketed. IDENTIFIED.
• Against the required growth the reverse DCF solves for below (13.3%) — not bracketed; the highest peer growth is +11.8%. This is stated rather than smoothed over.
• Against the screen's 49% — not remotely bracketed. No listed plasma peer is within 37pp.

Exit multiple used: 10.5x EBIT, the midpoint of the two verifiable growth-matched plasma anchors (EBS 8.0x, KMDA 12.7x). Per valuation.md, "the base exit multiple may not sit below every stated anchor without a separately argued reason" — 10.5x sits between the anchors, not below both. Sensitivity spans 6.0x to 23.3x so the screen's number is visible in the grid rather than dismissed.

Implied compression from today's trading multiple: +0.0x (10.5x → 10.5x, +0.2%). The base case assumes no multiple compression at all on a name whose growth has stopped. That is generous, deliberately.

3. Peer Spread Criteria (MEASURED)

Named peer in the same end market: Kamada Ltd [KMDA] — plasma-derived therapeutics, IG and hyperimmunes.

The EV/Sales premium is entirely explained by the margin gap; EV/EBIT is the right basis and on it ADMA trades at a modest discount to a slower-margin, faster-growing peer. There is no obvious multiple discount to harvest — ADMA is already at the plasma-peer level.

Own-history percentile (required by valuation.md, computed on as-known XBRL stepped at filing dates, 1,903 trading days, 2019-01-02 → 2026-07-29; series in data/adma_multiples.json):

(Percentile EV/EBIT of 9.66x uses reported TTM EBIT for series consistency; the 10.5x elsewhere uses clean TTM EBIT and diluted shares.)

4. Output 1 — the 12-month target

4.1 The own-multiple anchor is UNIDENTIFIED, and that is the finding

valuation.md step 3 requires the multiple be anchored on the name's own trading range. criteria.md requires: "If the history is too short or spans a regime change, declare it UNIDENTIFIED rather than substituting a peer median."

ADMA's own multiple history spans two regime changes inside 30 months:

1. Loss-making → profitable (2023–24). EV/EBIT is undefined before November 2023 and the 2023 median is 593x — an artifact of EBIT crossing zero, not a valuation.
2. Growth → no growth (6 May 2026). Revenue growth went from +19.6% (FY2025) to −0.3% (Q1'26); FY2026 guidance was cut 12–17%; all long-term guidance was withdrawn. The stock fell 16% in a day and the EV/Sales multiple has since traded in a tight 3.57–4.33x band, versus a 2024–25 median of 8.53x.

Being at the 7th percentile of the post-profitability window is not evidence of cheapness — that window was priced on a 20–50% growth rate that no longer exists. The post-cut window is only 57 trading days: a state, not a distribution.

Therefore: the own-history multiple anchor is declared UNIDENTIFIED. No peer median is substituted for it. Instead the target is built on the growth-matched plasma EBIT anchor from §2, with the own-history percentiles reported alongside as a cross-check, and the range presented conditionally.

4.2 The NTM base

valuation.md step 1 requires near-term consensus. No consensus was obtainable — Alpha Vantage's 25/day quota was exhausted when tested on 2026-07-29. Per criteria.md this leaves Consensus Criteria INDETERMINATE and blocks nothing. The base used is company guidance, explicitly labelled as such.

The two routes are averaged rather than the guidance route taken at face value, for one stated reason: guidance was reiterated on 25 February 2026 and cut 12–17% on 6 May 2026. A forward EBIT margin of 45.7% — 5.1pp above anything ADMA has yet delivered on a trailing basis — rests entirely on that guidance. Averaging with the demonstrated-margin route is the haircut, and it is disclosed rather than embedded.

4.3 The grid

Cross-check on EV/Sales against NTM revenue of $566.7m, using own-history multiples:

The EV/EBIT central case ($10.45) and the full-history EV/Sales median ($10.83) land within 4% of each other by two independent routes. The post-profitability median ($19.90) is the multiple the market paid when ADMA was a 40%+ grower and is not achievable without that growth returning.

4.4 The 12-month target

$10.45 — +18.9% to spot ($8.79). ABOVE spot.

Range $7.91 – $12.70 (plasma-peer EBIT anchors 8.0x–12.7x). Multiple basis: growth-matched plasma-peer EBIT midpoint 10.5x. The name's own-history anchor is declared UNIDENTIFIED (two regime changes in 30 months) and no peer median was substituted for the own-history percentile, which is reported separately above.

Sensitivity not shown in the grid: the ASR has ~5.0m shares still to be delivered by August 2026. At a ~235.0m post-ASR diluted count the central target is $10.67 rather than $10.45 — a +2.1% effect, immaterial to the conclusion.

No external professional target exists on file for ADMA, so no sanity-band comparison is made. None is invented.

5. Output 2 — the implied-path test (the Valuation Criteria)

Run with assets/reverse_dcf.py. Solving for revenue CAGR.

Held fixed, named explicitly: terminal EBIT margin 35.0%, exit multiple 10.5x EBIT, WACC 10.0%, horizon 5 years, revenue base $509.864m TTM, EV $2,168.3m (diluted).

Terminal margin of 35.0% sits below ADMA's demonstrated TTM clean margin of 40.6% and far above every listed plasma peer (EBS 13.5%, KMDA 14.4%, Grifols 16.5%). It is a deliberately generous assumption: ADMA is given credit for holding a margin 2.4x its end-market peers in perpetuity.

EV implied by today's price   2,168m   (4.25x current revenue)
Held fixed                    terminal margin=35.0%, exit multiple=10.5x
Discount rate / horizon       10.0% over 5y

>>> THE MARKET REQUIRES: revenue CAGR of 13.3%

5.1 The margin — demonstrated − required

The margin the strategy ranks on: −6.5pp, using the most recent forward-looking figure the company itself stands behind.

The screen reported +44.7pp. The 51.2pp swing decomposes cleanly:

5.2 Sensitivity over the exit multiple — required 5-year revenue CAGR

(WACC 10.0%; the sensitivity is run on the multiple, never on scenario probabilities.)

Read the row that matters. At the demonstrated terminal margin of 40.6% and the growth-matched exit of 10.5x, the required CAGR is 9.9% — still above the FY2026 guided midpoint of 6.8%, and only inside the guided high end of 9.8% by 0.1pp. There is no cell in this table where the plasma-peer-anchored multiple and the company's own central guidance produce a positive margin.

The only cells that produce a comfortable margin are at 15x–23.3x — i.e. multiple expansion of +43% to +122% from today, which is precisely what the screen assumed without stating.

5.3 WACC sensitivity

Even at the CAPM WACC of 8.7%, the required 11.9% exceeds the guided high end of 9.8%.

5.4 Terminal value share

100% by construction — the reverse DCF discounts a single terminal EV. The forward-DCF cross-check at the base path (g = 13.3%, tm 35%, exit 10.5x, WACC 10%) gives a PV of terminal EV of $2,172m against the EV implied by price of $2,168m: the instrument closes on itself, confirming the solve. Per valuation.md the reverse DCF is therefore the primary long-horizon output and the forward DCF is supporting evidence only.

5.5 Solving for the other unknowns

At the company's own central guidance, today's price requires either a 14.1x exit multiple (+34% expansion from today, above the top plasma anchor of 12.7x) or a terminal EBIT margin of 46.9% — 6.3pp above anything ADMA has ever delivered and 3.3x the listed plasma peer average.

6. Valuation Criteria verdict

criteria.md test:

• PASS — implied path at or below what the business has demonstrated.
• PASS WITH ARGUMENT — price requires more than demonstrated and there is a specific, evidenced reason (a named product cycle, mix shift, pricing action). Narrative does not qualify.
• FAIL — price requires materially more and the argument is narrative.

Was PASS WITH ARGUMENT available? The argument was constructed and tested.

The argument: ASCENIV grew +27.7% in Q1 2026 and is now 85% of revenue. The drag is BIVIGAM (−54%, $104m TTM and shrinking). Once BIVIGAM is immaterial, total growth converges on ASCENIV's growth. If ASCENIV compounds 20% and BIVIGAM decays 25% a year:

⇒ 14.4% total CAGR — which would clear the required 13.3%.

Why it does not qualify. The argument requires ASCENIV to sustain ~20% for five years, and ASCENIV is volume-bounded by litres of qualifying high-titer plasma × yield × approved throughput:

• The yield term is a one-time +20%, fully in the base by end-FY2026 (10-K: "first full year"). There is no disclosed follow-on.
• The litres term is shrinking internally: ten centres → seven, and the 10-K states "we do not plan to build additional plasma collection facilities." High-titer plasma is "typically found in less than 10%" of donor samples.
• The incremental litres are contracted from Grifols and others at "an escalating price per liter… with a minimum annual price increase every 12 months" — a margin headwind, not a tailwind, working directly against the 35–40% terminal margin the same case assumes.

So the path exists arithmetically, but no evidenced source of the incremental qualifying plasma is named by the company, and the company has said it will not build one. criteria.md is explicit that narrative does not qualify.

The two genuinely evidenced forward items are (a) the paediatric label expansion, approved 4 May 2026 — real, dated, delivered, and unsized by the company, and (b) the McKesson Specialty distribution agreement — real, unquantified. Neither is sized by ADMA and neither is invented here. Together they are not enough to close a 6.5pp gap against a company that cut guidance 12–17% and withdrew a five-year target ten weeks after reiterating it.

Valuation Criteria: FAIL

Required 5-year revenue CAGR 13.3% (terminal margin 35.0%, exit multiple 10.5x, WACC 10.0%, five years, all held fixed and named). Company-guided FY2026 growth 6.8% midpoint. Margin = −6.5pp. Implied compression from today's 10.5x trading multiple: +0.0x. The argument for closing the gap requires unnamed incremental high-titer plasma the company has stated it will not build.

7. Reconciliation to the screen, in one table